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Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: Protected Categories under Title VII? 
Lowell Ritter 
 
Plaintiffs and their attorneys have an increasingly viable argument that Title VII’s definition of 
“sex” includes sexual orientation and gender identity, expanding employers’ potential liability. 
This is based in part on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) firm position 
that both sexual orientation and gender identity are protected under the statute. 
Indeed, the EEOC has identified “coverage of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender individuals 
under Title VII's sex discrimination provisions” as one of the foremost national enforcement 
priorities in their Strategic Enforcement Plan, which spans through 2016. Even the most well-
intentioned employers are vulnerable to claims by an aggrieved employee or applicant as well as 
the possibility of costly, public litigation. 
Background  
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination “with respect to [an 
individual’s] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 USC §2000e-2(a)(1). Whether Title 
VII protects discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity has not been 
definitively answered and any finality will likely only come once a legislative solution has been 
reached by Congress and/or the Supreme Court interprets the statute’s term.  
Gender Identity 
Even though courts and the EEOC initially concluded in the 1970s and 80s that gender identity 
was not protected under Title VII, that is no longer true.  
Employers can be liable for discrimination based on sex stereotyping, such as concluding that a 
female employee does not conform to the employer’s version of being “lady-like enough.” Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In 2012, the EEOC definitively concluded that 
gender identity discrimination comes within Title VII’s definition of “sex” and is, therefore, 
prohibited by the statute. Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (4/20/12). 
Relying in part on Price Waterhouse, the agency reasoned that “sex” in Title VII includes both 
biological sex and gender (including “the cultural and social aspects associated with masculinity 
and femininity”) and that Title VII prohibits gender stereotyping. Importantly, the EEOC 
concluded that gender stereotyping is just one way in which a plaintiff can prove a prima facie 
case of sex discrimination with the primary question always being “whether the employer 
actually relied on the employee's gender in making its decision,” whatever form that may take.  
Subsequently, the EEOC filed its first two lawsuits, EEOC v. Lakeland Eye Clinic, P.A., M.D. 
Fla., No. 8:14-02421, complaint filed 9/25/14 and EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes 
Inc., E.D. Mich., No. 2:14-13710 complaint filed 9/25/14, alleging sex discrimination based on 
the firing of a transgender employee.  
The Lakeland Eye Clinic case settled; Lakeland paid $150,000 to the former employee in 
addition to providing a letter of reference, instituting an anti-discrimination policy and 
implementing anti-discrimination training. The R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. case 
survived a motion to dismiss in Michigan federal court and recently entered mediation.  
Following these two lawsuits, the EEOC has been steadily pursuing enforcement of transgender 
bias claims. In September 2015, the EEOC intervened to join a plaintiff suing First Tower Loan, 
LLC, alleging his termination for being transgender constituted sex discrimination. Broussard v. 
First Tower Loan, LLC, E.D. La. No. 2:15-01161, complaint filed 4/13/15.  
Even more recently, Deluxe Financial in Minnesota paid $115,000 in January 2016 to settle 
claims that the plaintiff was not allowed to use the women’s restroom in addition to other 
offensive comments and harassment. The company agreed to issue an apology and provide a 
future reference. The settlement also included a three-year consent decree that requires their 
health plan not exclude necessary medical care based on transgender status, a revised EEO 
policy, annual training, and annual reports to the EEOC. 
Notwithstanding the regulatory climate, some courts have been unwilling to expand Title VII’s 
definition, concluding that “discrimination against a transsexual based on the person's status as a 
transsexual is not discrimination because of sex under Title VII.” Etsitty v. Utah Transit 
Authority, 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
But courts are split. The Eleventh Circuit recently held that “[s]ex discrimination includes 
discrimination against a transgender person for gender nonconformity,” allowing the plaintiff to 
proceed to trial. Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 641 Fed.App’x. 883 (11th Cir. 2016). 
Courts are moving in the direction of recognizing gender identity discrimination as a form of sex 
discrimination. Even outside of court, employers are facing costly settlements in addition to 
required adoption of new policies and training.  
Sexual Orientation 
Like gender identity, the EEOC did not always support the proposition that Title VII’s definition 
of “sex” includes sexual orientation. The EEOC’s groundbreaking decision on this issue 
involved a former air traffic controller who alleged he was not selected for a promotion because 
of his sexual orientation. David Baldwin v. Dep't of Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 
0120133080 (July 15, 2015). The EEOC, analogizing the protections for federal employees to 
those in the private sector, concluded that “[s]exual orientation discrimination is sex 
discrimination because it necessarily entails treating an employee less favorably because of the 
employee’s sex.”  
The EEOC also recognized coverage based on “associational discrimination” and 
“discrimination based on gender stereotypes.” For example, an employer basing an adverse 
employment action on the idea that “‘real’ men should date women and not other men” would be 
unlawful stereotyping in the EEOC’s eyes. Mr. Baldwin filed suit in federal district court in 
Florida once the EEOC issued their decision. Baldwin v. Secretary, United States Department of 
Transportation, S.D. Fla., 1:15-23825, complaint filed 10/13/15.  
Many courts do not accept the EEOC’s position. For example, the Seventh Circuit recently ruled 
in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, No. 15‐1720, 2016 WL 4039703, (7th Cir. 2016) that 
Title VII’s definition of “sex” does not include sexual orientation. The Court wrote that they 
were bound by Seventh Circuit Precedent while recognizing the “...paradoxical legal landscape 
in which a person can be married on Saturday and then fired on Monday for just that act.” This is 
the first Court of Appeals to rule on the issue since the EEOC took their strong position in 
Baldwin. No Court of Appeals has ruled that Title VII covers sexual orientation discrimination.  
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have ruled only that LGBT workers who do not conform to gender 
stereotypes (e.g., not being “manly enough”) have a Title VII claim. Several district courts have 
seemed to accept the EEOC’s position, at least in dicta, including district courts in 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Ohio, Oregon, and California. 
Legislative Responses 
20 states and Washington, D.C. protect against both sexual orientation and gender identity 
discrimination. For example, in California, the text of the statute reads: 
It is an unlawful employment practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational 
qualification, or, except where based upon applicable security regulations established by 
the United States or the State of California: 
 
(a) For an employer, because of the ... genetic information, marital status, sex, 
gender, gender identity, gender expression, ... [or] sexual orientation of any 
person, to refuse to hire or employ the person or to refuse to select the person for 
a training program leading to employment, or to bar or to discharge the person 
from employment or from a training program leading to employment, or to 
discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment. Cal. Gov. Code §12940. 
 
While California’s statute is broad, other states are less comprehensive or non-existent. This 
creates a patchwork of laws across the United States without protection on the federal level. 
Because courts seem reluctant to recognize protection under Title VII, a national response may 
come only through Congress. 
 
Proposed federal law includes the Employment Non-Discrimination Act which would prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, but it has failed to pass Congress 
year after year.  The Equality Act (S. 1858, H.R. 3185), introduced on July 23, 2015, would 
amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964, among other laws, to explicitly include sexual orientation 
and gender identity as protected classes.  
It is clear the Title VII legal landscape is changing and presenting a challenge to courts and 
legislators alike, with any type of finality only to come from Congress or the Supreme Court.  
 
